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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 07/03/2011 Accident number: 693 
Accident time: 10:05 Accident Date: 26/07/2010 
Where it occurred: Mf:411,, Sharajah 2, 
NW Sector, Ramtha 
Region 
Country: Jordan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  




Date record created:  Date  last modified: 07/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: 35. 94891 E Map north: 32. 68064 N 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 
use of rake (?) 




A report of this accident was made available by the demining group involved in late 2010. Its 
conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.  Text in 
square brackets [ ] is editorial.  
The internal investigation report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Incident investigation for [Demining group] – MINE ACTION TEAM - JORDAN 
Task Name: shajarah 2 (411), north border project, NW SECTOR  
GRID REF: 32. 68064 N: 35. 94891 E 
MINEFIELD NO: - 411, minefield TASK ID:- shajarah 2 
Investigation conducted by – [Name removed]  
Victim, deminer:  [Name removed], DATE OF BIRTH:  1 April 1975, NIC NO:  [Removed] 
TEAM LEADER: [Name removed], Team: Bravo 
TIME OF INCIDENT: 10:05 hrs, DATE OF INCIDENT: 26 July 2010 
NATURE OF INJURY: comminuted metatarsal fracture with penetrating wound in his left foot 
TYPE OF MINE: M14 AP mine 
 
IMSMA DETAILED REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT Monday, 26 July 2010,  
Part 1 – Description of the incident 
1. Organisation name [Demining group], JORDAN, Team No: Bravo  
2. Incident date: 26 July 2010: Time: 10:05 hrs  
3. Location of incident: NW SECTOR, Province: Ramtha, Village: Shajarah, Project or task 
No: Shajarah 2 (411) 
4. Name of site manager or team leader: [Name removed] 
5. Type of incident: Uncontrolled detonation of a mine  
6. Device was detonated by: Deminer 
7. Device detonated while: Searching 12 o’clock mine  
8. Device was found in an area classified as:  a known Hazardous Area 
9. Narrative (Describe how the incident happened.  Attach additional pages and photographs 
or diagrams to assist in clarifying the circumstances surrounding the incident):  
While the deminer was clearing an area assigned to him by the team leader and after he 
recovered an AT Saci mine he entered the contaminated hazardous area trying to locate the 
AP M14 12 o’clock mine with out following the SOP and the proper procedure , then he 
stepped on a non cleared area and activated the M14 which caused a badly injured to his left 
foot. 
Part 2 – Injuries 
10. Did the incident result in any injuries?  Yes 
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11. List people injured and nature of injury 
[Name removed], deminer, Fracture and Penetration wound in Lt Foot 
Part 3 – Equipment damages 
12. Did the incident result in any damage to equipment or property? Yes  
13. List any mine action equipment or property damage 
Demining Boot, [Blast boot] Damaged (Not Reusable)   
14. List damage to equipment or property owned by a member of the public or the 
government.  Include contact details of the owner or responsible person. [None] 
Part 4 – Explosive hazard  
15. Provide details of mines/UXO/ other devices that were involved in the incident. 
AP (Blast) Mine, Buried 
16. State specific device (if known): Anti-Personal Mine, M14 
17. Comments (include measurements of any crater resulting from the explosion): 
 Crater Depth: approx. 17 cm / Width: approx. 20 cm  
Part 5 - Site conditions 
18. Describe the conditions at the site at time of the incident 
Ground/Terrain: Soft 
Weather: Clear, hot 
Vegetation: Heavy, grass 
Part 6 – Team and task details 
20. Qualifications of Member(s) involved in the incident: 
[The Victim], deminer 
21. How long had this team been?    
a. At this site?  1 Month 15 days 
b. working on this task? 1 Month 15 days 
c. working on the day? 3 Hours & 35  minutes 
22. Detector type: F3, Serial Number:  N14 691, Detector status: Functional, Passed to 
[Name removed] for technical inspection at  Shajarh 2 Site(location) on 22 of July 2010. 
Tripwire feeler used? No.  
23. Hand tool: HEAVY RAKE 
24. PPE:  Vest, Visor [Blast boots] 
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[A photograph of the Victim’s damaged BfR V-50 blast boot after the event.] 
25. Comments: [None]  
Part 7 - Medical & First Aid 
Medical treatment required: yes  
26. Medical Support at Incident Site: Medic, 1st Aid Kit, Stretcher, Ambulance, Safety Vehicle,  
Radio to call forward medic. 
27. Was a Mine Incident Drill carried out?  Yes. 
28. Time and distance data 
a. Time from incident to SECTION MEDICAL POINT: (1) minutes  
b. Time spent at site administering treatment:  (9) minutes  
c. Time from evacuation FROM to arrival King Abdullah Hospital: (20) minutes 
Part 8 – Reporting procedures 
Reported by: [Name removed], [Demining group] Jaber Office to: [Demining group] Offices & 
NCDR  
Investigation conducted by: [Name removed], [Name removed] 
Report compiled/translated by: [Name removed] 
Verified by: [Name removed] 
 
Findings 
The deminer did  not apply the marking system on the ground. 
The deminer did not use the base stick 
The deminer scratch the whole area around AT mine. 
The deminer step on unclear area. 
Piles of grass were found in the centre lane 
Dirt crusts were found in the centre lane. 
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Operation Manager Analysis 
The incident happened due to an individual mistake that  the soil very soft and the instructions 
for the deminers in that site tells that the 1st 10 cm from the ground have to be checked by 
the MD then the soil have to be removed using the long handle RAKE after confirming that 
there is no metal in that layer in order to fill the expected cavities in the ground, then the 
deminer have to check that tray using the MD to insure that there is no mines up to 25cm 
depth (this because an incident happened in a similar task in Al Shajarah1 the last year when 
the foot of one of deminers slipped in the soft soil and activated M14 in a depth of 25 cm). 
 
[The picture shows the detector in the foreground and a Heavy rake above the initiation site – 
so implying that the rake was in his hand at the time.] 
 
From the incident result it is clearly obvious that the mine was not buried deeper than 20 cm, 
which mean that using  the MD with the combination method the mine will be located and 
recovered safely, the metal detector checked directly after the incident and it was operating 
properly, but its look like the deminer was applying one of the following scenarios: 
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1st Scenario: 
The deminer was using the metal detector from a long distance away from the surface of the 
ground more than 10 cm (see the photo), the vegetation, the site of the incident crater support 
this scenario. 
2nd scenario: 
The deminer was not following the proper procedure and he tried to locate the mine by 
guessing using the heavy RAKE, finding the heavy RAKE in that distance away from the base 
stick supporting this scenario. 
 
Result: 
1. There is no problem with the procedure that if the procedure followed in the proper way the 
incident could not happened. 
2. The tools (the metal detector) checked and it was working properly and if it used the proper 
way it would locate the signal of the mine. 
3. The team consist 5 deminers they supervised directly by the team leader, and they were 
quality assured by the internal quality assurance officer, the clearance coordinator and the 
external quality assurance team, the task visited last on 18 July 2010 by the external QA team 
and on 19 July 2010 by the internal QA and no major mistakes reported also the deminer 
himself visited by the team leader the same day of the incident And he was working properly, 
the attitude of the deminer and deciding breaking all the instruction at that time is not justified. 
4. The incident happened due to an individual mistake that the deminer was not following the 
proper procedures as per as [Demining group] (NBP)SOP to locate, approach, mark and 
recover the mine. 
 
Attachments: 
Statements by Witnesses  
Photographs of Injuries 
Injury data sheet(s)  
Photographs of Incident Site  
Copy of Incident Report 
Copy of Medical Report  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 879 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 35 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 30 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron Protection used: Frontal apron, Mask 





Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Foot 




A Medical report in Arabic is held on file. The pictures below show the would (open at the side 





Statement 1: Witness deminer 
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I was removing grass from the beckets of the old work and then at 10:05 am I heard a sound 
of explosion from the west side of my site so I looked to find smoke coming from the deminer 
[The Victim] site and I couldn’t see him from that smoke, I shouted 3 times (Accident), went to 
him, when I reached I found him lying on the center lane area screaming and in great pain 
then I held his shoulders and calmed him, other deminers came and we evacuated him out of 
the field where we found the nurse and the ambulance at the end of the lane, the nurse made 
some necessary procedures to him then they evacuated him to the hospital with the deminer 
[Name removed] who has the same blood type. 
Q: Did the team leader give you the morning work brief? 
A: Yes, he did. 
Q: What is the reverse method to work on this field? 
A: It is the Combination method and dig up to 15 cm. 
Q: Did you notice any strange behaviors from the injured as you are the closest to him?  
A: No, I didn’t. 
Q: Did you see the way he was working on? 
A: No, I want that close. 
Q: what was the depth average for the mines you cleared from that area? 
A: Around 20 cm. 
Q: How many times did the team leader check on you? 
A: He did it twice that day. 
 
Statement 2: Team Leader  
On the 26th of July 2010 at 6:30 am we reached our working area and I started the morning 
work brief for the whole team and reminded them of the SOPs then distributed them to their 
locations, at 6:40 am  I started my check on each deminer , at 10:05 am while I was making 
QC on the deminer [Name removed]’s site I heard a sound of explosion and I knew 
immediately that it was from the deminer [the Victim]’s site, I informed the ambulance and 
went to the accident site, I found the deminer [Name removed] there and the injured was lying 
on the ground on the center lane area, we evacuated him to the ambulance area, they made 
the necessary procedures to him then evacuated him to the hospital. 
Q:  How many times you checked on deminer [the Victim] work that day? 
A:  3 times. 
Q:  What was his productivity that day until the accident happened? 
A: around 7 m² (searching for missing mine method).  2 Sachi mines cleared, 3 AP mines 
cleared +the AP mine which was exploded by him. 
Q: what is the average of the injured productivity? 
A: Around 25 m² daily. 
Q: Did you make QC on the same cluster which the accident happened in? 
A: No, but I did to the previous cluster 3 times. 
Q: Did you notice anything on the injured that day? 
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A: No, I didn’t. 
Q: Did he experience an explosion before? 
A: Yes, on Sabha 1 task. 
Q: Did you notice bushes of grass on the center lane area when you checked on the 
deminer? 
A: No, he removed them all and put them on the bushes area. 
Q: What is the average of the mine depth on the accident area? 
A: Around 18-20 cm. 
Q: Do you have any notes about the injured on your note book? 
A: No, nothing. 
Note: there was no note book with the team leader. 
 
Analysis 
Although the deminer may have had his detector in his hand at the time, the presence of the 
Heavy rake above the seat of the ignition, coupled with a lack of marking and a general 
disregard for the SOPs, suggest that this was a Missed mine accident and the Victim held the 
Heavy rake in his hand when he stepped on the mine.  
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was working without proper marking and without regard to his SOPs when the accident 
occurred. The Victim was apparently hacking at the long grass with his Heavy-rake when he 
stepped on an unseen mine in the grass. When comparing the boot damage and the injury 
with other accidents stepping on an M14, it seems likely that the mine was on, or very close 
to, the surface. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because 
the investigators did not recognize a need for the supervisors to take responsibility when 
those under their control ignore the rules. 
The demining group’s concern to investigate accidents, correct errors and share accident 
reports indicates a commendable professionalism.   
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